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Abstract—The influence of Deep Learning on image identifi-
cation and natural language processing has attracted enormous
attention globally. The convolution neural network that can learn
without prior extraction of features fits well in response to the
rapid iteration of Android malware. The traditional solution
for detecting Android malware requires continuous learning
through pre-extracted features to maintain high performance
of identifying the malware. In order to reduce the manpower
of feature engineering prior to the condition of not to ex-
tract pre-selected features, we have developed a coloR -inspired
convolutional neuRal networks (CNN)-based AndroiD malware
Detection (R2-D2 ) system. The system can convert the bytecode
of classes.dex from Android archive file to rgb color code and
store it as a color image with fixed size. The color image is
input to the convolutional neural network for automatic feature
extraction and training. The data was collected from Jan. 2017
to Aug 2017. During the period of time, we have collected
approximately 2 million of benign and malicious Android apps
for our experiments with the help from our research partner
Leopard Mobile Inc. Our experiment results demonstrate that
the proposed system has accurate security analysis on contracts.
Furthermore, we keep our research results and experiment
materials on http://R2D2.TWMAN.ORG.
Index Terms—Deep Learning, Android Malware Detection,
Convolutional Neural Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, smartphone has become a daily necessity in our
life. In the smartphone market, Android is the most commonly
used operating system (OS), and it is still expanding its
market share. According to the report by International Data
Corporation (IDC) in 2018, the market share of Android in
smartphone market was approximately 85% in 2017 Q1 (see
Fig. 1) [1]. Android is featured by its openness; users can
choose to download apps from Google Play or third-party
marketplace. However due to the popularity and openness, An-
droid has attracted attacker’s attention. Particularly, malicious
software (malware) can easily be spread and infects benign
Android devices. The Security Report of AV-TEST Institute
shows that while the number of malware increased from 17
million in 2005 to over 600 million in 2016, the percentage
of Android malware had a significant increase from 3.19% in
2015 to 7.48% in 2016 Q2. Among them, Trojans targeting
at stealing user data occupied 97.49%. We also found that
Android malware has dominated the market with 99.87% on
the number of malware on smartphone platform [2]. Fig. 2
shows the statistics collected from our back-end system in
January 2017. In countries such as the United States, United
Kingdom, and France, etc., more than 50,000 users were
infected daily. Moreover, according to our mobile security
report [3], it shows that the number of Android malware
increased sharply from 1 million in 2012 to 2.8 million in
2014. In 2015, the number of Android malware detected was
three times than the one in 2014 (over 9.5 million). In 2016 the
number of Android malware achieved more than 17 million. In
the first half of 2017, there was more than 10 million Android
malware found in Security Master and Clean Master. It has
been five years that the number of malware found in Android
exceeded the number of malware found in Windows OS over
the past 21 years [4]. It is obvious that we cannot neglect
the security problem from Android nowadays. To deal with
the serious security problem caused by Android malware, we
proposed the coloR -inspired convolutional neuRal networks
(CNN)-based AndroiD malware Detection, R2-D2, to detect
Android malware. R2-D2 is different from existing solutions.
The R2-D2 detection is featured by its end-to-end learning
process. More specifically, in contrast to the prior solutions
that require manual process of feature selection and parameter
configuration, R2-D2 can effectively decrease the resource
inputs of manpower and computing. With R2-D2, we can now
process and analyze tons of real-time data faster than before.
Meanwhile, we can also detect unknown Android malware in
a more effective way.
II. RELATED WORK
A. The Background of Android Malware Analysis
Android Package (APK) is the format used by Android OS
for the distribution and installation of mobile apps. Essentially,
APK file is a type of zip-formatted archive file. The structure
of APK can be dissected as follows:
• META-INIF/: containing the information description
from Java jar file.
• res/: containing the resource document.
• libs/: containing the .so library from Android Native
Development (NDK).
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Fig. 1. World Smartphones OS Market Share.
Fig. 2. Statistics collected from our back-end system in January 2017 in the
US, UK and France.
• AndroidManifest.xml: contains the configuration file
about the authorization and service.
• classes.dex: containing the dalvik byte-code, i.e., Android
execution file.
• resource.asc: containing the binary resource file after
compilation.
Fig. 3 shows the compilation process of Android APK. First
we compile all of the Java source code (including R.Java and
Java Interface etc.), generating the .class files. After that, all
of the .class files are transformed into dex format generating
.dex files supported by Davik VM (Dalvik VM is alike Java
VM). It is a bytecode compiler provided on Android phones,
mainly developed by company such as Google etc., with the
minimal requirement on the resource. In other word, Dalvik
VM can be run on the mobile devices with limited computing
and memory resource but with acceptable performance. The
.dex file is a Java application program, which is in Dalvik
executable format. It is all packaged as Android Package (.apk)
file by apkbuilder.
One of the most common approaches for Android mal-
ware detection is static analysis (signature-based) method. It
works through reverse-engineering tools such as Apktool 1,
1https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/install/
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Fig. 3. The compilation process of Android APK.
Fig. 4. The popular class naming format in benign Android apps.
backsmali 2, dex2jar3, and JD-GUI 4, to decompile Android
App to access the source code from classes.dex. Furthermore,
AXMLPrinter2 5 is used to analyze the AndroidManifest.xml
to access the permission for using Android Apps. Another
category of approach for Android malware detection is the dy-
namic analysis (behavior-based) method. The idea behind this
category is to continuously track the system communications
and network connections or messages by emulating Android
apps through techniques such as sandbox (eg. Droidbox6),
virtual machine and other operating environment in order
to require the dynamic analysis of the behavior model. The
security experts then analyze and inspect the records to see
whether the malicious behaviors occur. If so, virus pattern
and black/white-list are generated for pattern matching and
for capturing the malware. However, anti-analysis techniques
such as obfuscation, encryption, and anti-debugging are also
proposed by hackers to hide the malicious behaviors to escape
from the detection [5]. In fact, the above approaches are
useless when the malware programmers make modification
on the initial components in malware, which can evade the
detection.
2https://bitbucket.org/JesusFreke/smali/downloads/
3https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar
4https://github.com/java-decompiler/jd-gui
5https://code.google.com/archive/p/android4me/downloads
6https://github.com/pjlantz/droidbox
Fig. 5. The common way for declaring the data variables.
Fig. 6. Certain random naming format will be used by opfake family.
Fig. 4 shows the popular class naming in benign An-
droid apps (e.g. intellij.annotations and features2d). Fig. 5
shows the common way for declaring the data variables (e.g.
paramBitmap and paramLoadedForm). However, to evade the
detection, certain random naming (e.g. dsrhki.yjgfqjejkjh and
nlrskgblc) will be used by “opfake” family (shown in Fig.
6). Fig. 7 shows the “fakeinst” family that can automatically
encrypt variables (e.g. jj = 84f113ee155ba4f1e280b54401fffab
and jj1 = 84f113ee155ba43f1e280b54401fffab).
B. Machine Learning-based Malware Detection
Machine learning is a technique that enables the machine
to learn the pattern, build the model, and make the prediction
by seeing only the raw data. Currently, the most widespread
malware attacks are still "exploit attack" and "privileged
escalation". As a result, most of the machine learning-based
malware detection still use the features such as the Android
apps permissions, API invocation and control flow graphs
(CFG) to distinguish between the benign and malicious apps.
Usually, SVM and random forest are used to build the model
to distinguish between benign and malicious apps.
For example, DroidMiner [6] has a two-step flow-chart to
represent the behaviours of Android apps and capture the exe-
cution logs behind the apps. After that, rectors are clustered to
identify the similar code snippet. Lei Chen et al. [7] extracted
features from Android API invocation as a reverse engineering
approach. They apply normalization procedure to the extracted
featuring and perform logistic regression on the extracted
feature to detect Android malware. Moreover, the dataset
used by the current research-oriented machine learning-based
Android malware detection is rather small. Most of existing
solutions train their detection models sorely based on small
datasets. This cause the practicality problem because the real
Fig. 7. Encrypt variables by the fakeinst family.
world malware may have distinguished distinctive behaviors
and the existing detection models usually cannot successfully
identify the Zero-day exploit malware by correlating the API
invocation and Android permissions.
C. Deep Learning
Recent success in deep learning research and development
attracts people’s attention [8]. In 2015, Google released Ten-
sorflow [9], a framework of realizing deep learning algorithm.
Deep learning is a specific type of machine learning. More
specifically, deep learning is an artificial neural network, in
which multiple layers of neurons are interconnected with
different weights and activation functions to learn the hidden
relationship between input and output. Intuitively, input data
is fed to the first layer that generates different combinations
of the input [10]. After the activation function, these combina-
tions are fed to the second layer, and so on. Under the above
procedures, different combinations of the outputs from previ-
ous layer can be seen as different representation of features.
The weights on links between layers are adjusted according
to backward propagations, depending on the distance or less
function between true output label and the label calculated
by neural network. Note that deep learning can be seen as a
neural network with a large number of layers. After the above
learning process via multiple layers, we can derive a better
understanding and representation of distinguishable features,
enhancing the detection accuracy [11].
In addition to deep neural networks, the most well-known
deep networks are convolutional neural networks (CNN). The
representation of CNN includes AlexNet, VGG, GoogleNet,
Inception-v3 and ResNet [12][13][14][15]. More specifically,
CNN is composed of hidden layers, fully connected layers,
convolution layers, and pooling layers. The hidden layers are
used to increase the complexity of the model. If the same
number of neural is associated with the input image, the
number of parameters can be significantly reduced, adapting
to the function structure much properly.
D. Deep Learning-based Malware Detection
[16] proposes a malware detection in which the Windows
API inquiry generates a corresponding ID, which is treated
as the input of the deep-learning architecture (eg. stack of
Auto-Encoders), and then it fine-tunes the model parameters.
[17] is a method that it works on feature extracting first,
such as contextual byte features, PE import features, string
2d histogram features, and PE metadata features. Then, the
extracted features are fed to the deep neural network (DNN).
With the training of two hidden layers, it is categorized.
[18] uses static analysis to extract features such as required
permission, sensitive API, and also uses dynamic analysis
to extract features such as "action dex class load", "action
recrent" and "action service start", from 500 samples for about
200 features as the input for the deep belief network (DBN).
Noted, there is similarity between the execution logic of
Android malicious apps and the order of functions being
called. Thus, in addition to the aforementioned solutions that
apply DNN to malware analysis based on "exploit attack" and
"privileged escalation", another category of malware detection
relies on n-gram analysis on byte-code or op-code. For ex-
ample, [19] and [20] first calculate the n-grams on the binary
byte-code and then perform the malware detection based on k-
nearest neighbor. [21] proposes to do reverse-engineering first
and then analyzes op-code. In addition, one more category
of the malware detection relies on transforming malware into
the images. For example, [22] proposes to first transform
binary byte-code into gray scale image and then applies pattern
recognition to the gray scale image.
All of the above methods have achieved a certain level of
detection accuracy. Deep learning once is seemed as the cure
for the above problem. However, a pre-processing step, such as
feature engineering, is still needed before the model is learnt.
Also, the dataset used by the current research-oriented machine
learning-based Android malware detection is rather small. The
dataset for training the model usually cannot reflect real-world
malware accurately. On the other hand as mentioned in the
introduction, the number of malware increased dramatically.
Even worse, more and more anti-debugging techniques are
discovered. The size of dataset used for training the model
also has significant impacts on the detection accuracy and the
computing efficiency in the training process. Here, we partic-
ularly note that despite the detection accuracy of the n-gram
approach, N-gram approach consumes substantial computing
resources and time for handling the dynamic growth of the
model parameters required, implying the impracticality [23].
However, if we have limited computing resources and time,
CNN is able to handle the explosive data growth because the
increasing number of parameters does not imply the growth
of computing resource and time required. Recently, [24] also
proposes deep learning-based malware detection, where the
sequences of the op-code are encoded as one-hot vectors for
the input of CNN. However, this method needs to dissemble
the Android apps via reverse-engineering tools (backsmali)
for deriving smali source code from classes.dex, and therefore
cannot handle malware with encryption (as shown in Fig. 6
and Fig. 7) or obfuscation [25], [26], [27].
III. OUR PROPOSED MECHANISM: R2-D2
A. The Characteristic of Our Methodology
According to the second chapter and our previous research
projects, the mainstream is still using the static analysis to
identify features via reverse engineering the source code of
Android apps and using dynamic analysis to collect the order
of API calls. Though a certain degree of detection accuracy
is presented, the reality is that due to the rapid iteration, and
various reverse engineering analytic method, we found that the
amount of unknown sample (called gray sample) still cannot
be detected by current methods. It is difficult to improve the
detection efficiency and its accuracy [3][28]. If unknown new
Android Apps are scanned on user’s Android devices, no
matter it is benign or malware, we may need to upload the
APK to our back-end and then undergo manual or automatic
feature extraction. After that, we can start identification. This
process consumes a large amount of network traffic on user
side, and it is not real-time enough on efficiency in the process.
If gray sample can be detected fast enough, we can decrease
the tendency for Android device to be attacked.
Fig. 8. Dalvik bytecode example code which detect the Android device’s
product model.
To solve the problem from traditional time-consuming and
resource-consuming method, according to our research of [19],
[20] and [21], we found that if Android apps execute similar
behavior, its API will perform similar order of opcode; for
example, as shown in Fig. 8, "6200" represents the sget-
object function "reads the object reference field identified by
the field_id into vx", and "0600" represents the "field address
of android/os/Build;.MODEL". "6e20" represents the invoke-
virtual function: "invokes a virtual method with parameters",
for extracting the value from v0 and v1 to compare, where v1
is from previous line const-string v1 of "1a01" to get the value
of google sdk ("puts reference to a string constant identified by
string_id into vx").
Fig. 9. Dalvik bytecode example code which try to install other apk.
Fig. 9 gives another example of what the Dalvik bytecode
shows if the Android applications try to install APK package
by itself. This is done by using "invoke-static v1" (7110) as
the Android API method "Landroid/net/Uri;.parse" to create an
URI (6e01), which parses the given encoded URI string, and
moves reference v1 and "move-result-object v1" (0c01) to the
string const-string v2 (1a02) specified by the given index into
the specified register v2 as"application/vnd.android.package-
archive" (f515), setting the data with an explicit MIME data
type. We will further explain the hexadecimal from byte-code
to rgb color code through the rule in section III.B.
Based on the studies of image detection in CNN
[12][13][14][15] and the method proposed by [22], we aim
to figure out the hidden relationship between the program
execution logic and the order of function calls behind the
malware by taking advantage of the CNN in order to accurately
detect known and even unknown malware. Since the bytecode
in classes.dex and rgb color code are both hexadecimal, we
proposed an algorithm that can convert the bytecode as rgb
color code into color image (called Android color images).
Then we applied CNN to the Android color images for
detecting the Android malware. Our proposed system, R2-D2
(coloR -inspired convolutional neuRal network-based androiD
malware Detection), works by decompressing Android apps
(APK) and then translating the dalvik executable classes.dex
into Android color images.
Based solely on Android color images, our R2-D2 system
achieves the end-to-end training and is able to make accurate
detection. The reason we are eager to achieve this end-to-
end training is that, we realize a huge amount of human
labor will be spent on feature engineering and detection
modeling. To ease the model training, we adopt the above
deep learning approach to construct an end-to-end learning-
based Android malware detection. Our R2-D2 possesses the
following advantages [29]:
• R2-D2 translates classes.dex into RGB color images,
without modifying the original Android apps and without
extracting features from the apps manually in advance.
It can complete a translation within 0.4 second. Such
translation is also featured by the fact that more complex
information in the Android apps can be preserved in the
color image with 16777216 colors (with 24 bit pixels per
sample) compared to the gray scale image with only 256
colors (with 8 bit pixels per sample).
• With the fully connected network infrastructure of DNN,
it can deal with rapid iterated malware with its large
amount of parameters, but the local receptive fields and
shared weights of CNN make it better for more complex
structure. It not only decreases the amount of parameters,
but also reflects the complexity of Android malware.
Comparing to current method, it saves a lot of time
without huge computation.
• The auto-image feature extraction in CNN does not
extract features directly from image for pattern recog-
nition. Instead, the raw pixels are represented by multi-
dimensional matrices. Then through the calculation of
filter and the size of stride in convolution layer, and non-
linear activation functions in pooling layer, it can enhance
the permutation relation between data.
• We only need the classes.dex in Android App, so if there
is unknown new App appears, we only need to transform
it to Android color image. The image size is about 10-
50kb. Compared to uploading the App to the back-end
and then processing the extraction and identification, R2-
D2 can not only save the traffic loading on user side, but
also reduce the resources and speed up the processing
efficiency. We will further explain the system architecture
and its process in section III.C and Fig. 15.
B. The Core Technology of Our Methodology
In the followings, we explain the algorithm procedures
of R2-D2 in more details. First of all, we collected the
Android apps from our research partner’s (Leopard Mobile
Inc.) original back-end detection system, the Android apps
were classified as benign and Trojan, RiskTool, HackTool,
AdWare, Banker, Clicker, Downloader, Dropper, FakeAV,
Monitor, SMS, Spy, Ransom, Exploit, and BackDoor. Then,
we decompressed the apps to retrieve the classes.dex and
presented as byte-code. We then mapped the hexadecimal from
byte-code to rgb color code through the rule (e.g., 646578 =
(R:100, G:101, B:120), 0A3033 = (R:10, G:48, B:51), 3500D1
= (R:53, G:0, B:209) and 4B1222 = (R:75, G:18, B:34) and
565778 = (R:86, G:87, B:120) etc.) shown in Fig. 10. Finally,
we reached an Android color image (shown in Fig. 11 and
12, which were four different Android benign and malware
apps), and the images are fed to CNN and training a model
to detection Android malware.
Fig. 10. The result of present byte-code as rgb color code.
Fig. 11. The color images example of benign Android apps.
Fig. 12. The color images example of malcious Android apps.
Meanwhile, we did an image distance test on our Android
malware image. The result shows that samples of the same
Android malware family share similarity in their visual
patterns that are close to each other in the sense of distance
from Levenshtein, RMS deviation and MSE image distance.
The results validated our proposed Android color image
algorithm that is suitable for the classification with CNN (e.g.,
00ee9561c5830690661467cc90b116de of Android:Jisut-JY
[Trj] from AVAST and cdaf446c3e1076ab48540e02283595ac
of Android.Trojan.SLocker.IS from BitDefender are
54.59% similar, 0cc0908c2fbd8f9b31da3afe05cb3427
of Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur.aa from
Kaspersky and ce2fedd0ca9327b8d52388c11ff3b4ca of
Android.Trojan.SLocker.IS from BitDefender are 54.94%
similar etc.), as shown in Fig. 13. Although the fine-grained
sense is not accurate, Android malware image visual mode of
this similarity can help us quickly classify Android malware,
while reducing labor costs [30].
However, we also found that two approaches might be used
to escape our Android malware detection.
• Since the traditional filter size of CNN is 3*3 or 5*5,
the uncorrelated bytecode might become correlated when
we transform classes.dex into images. The malware may
evade the detection by taking advantage of such a mis-
match.
• Pooling is a common approach in CNN model to re-
duce the computation overhead significantly in traditional
image recognition. The detection engine in our original
research inherently uses pooling to achieve the speedup.
However, Android color images are not natural images;
instead, they are formed from Android source code. Thus,
the pooling inevitably destroys the contexts and semantics
of the malware code, causing the detection inaccuracy.
• Noted that CNN trained model is not suited to be em-
bedded in Android App for malware detection due to the
reason that the file is too large.
AVAST_Android.Locker 
00ee9561c5830690661467cc90b116de
BitDefender_Android.Trojan.SLocker 
cdaf446c3e1076ab48540e02283595ac
BitDefender_Android.Trojan.SLocker 
ce2fedd0ca9327b8d52388c11ff3b4ca
KAV_Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur.aa 
0cc0908c2fbd8f9b31da3afe05cb3427
Fig. 13. The color images example of Android malware family apps.
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Fig. 14. The Inception-v3 structure.
To address the above two issues, we did many experiments
with CNN models (includes AlexNet, VGG, GoogleNet, and
Inception-v3). We found the characteristics of 1x1 convolution
in Inception-V3 (shown in Fig. 14). It replaces few filters
with a smaller perceptron layer with mixture of 1x1 and 3x3
convolutions, and 1x1 convolutions are specially used before
3x3 and 5x5 convolution to reduce the dimensions. In this way,
we can add more non-linearity by having ReLU immediately
after every 1x1 convolution and reduce the dimensions inside
this “inception module”. Based on [31], 1x1 convolution is
equivalent to cross-channel parametric pooling layer, and this
cascaded cross channel parametric pooling structure allows
complex and learnable interactions of cross channel informa-
tion. Cross channel information learning (cascaded 1x1 con-
volution) is biologically inspired because human visual cortex
has receptive fields (kernels) tuned to different orientation.
C. The Architecture of Our Methodology
Fig. 15 shows our system architecture. Step 3 to step 6 was
mentioned in III.A. Users do not need to upload to consume
network traffic. It can improve the efficiency of processing
and reduce the computing resources. It can also get rid of
the drawbacks of CNN mentioned in III.B while the training
model is too large to run on user side.
• Step 1. User scans the Apps on the Anndroid device.
• Step 2. If the Apps are all identified. The scanned results
will be provided to the users directly.
• Step 3. If there is unknown App, the system will trans-
form the classes,dex into Android color image.
• Step 4. Then upload the Android color image to the back-
end.
• Step 5. Feed the Android color image to the GPU
computing pool of tensorflow.
• Step 6. Identify the Apps with the trained Inception-v3
model.
• Step 7. Send the results to user’s phone.
Unrecognized
Android 
color images algorithm
Recognized
Scan Apps
Scan Results
R2-D2: coloR-inspired convolutional neuRal
network-based androiD malware Detection
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Inception-v3
User’s Android Device
Our back-end server
Our GPU Computing pool with Tensorflow
Step 7
Fig. 15. The architecture of R2-D2.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experiment Environment and Datasets
We run it on a 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04, and hardware setting are
128 GB DDR4 2400 RAM and Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2620 v4
CPU, NVIDIA TITAN V, TITAN XP and GTX 1080 GPUs;
more specifically, the software setting is the nvidia-docker
tensorflow:18.04-py2 on nVIDIA cloud. The research results
and the data from our research partner, Leopard Mobile Inc.,
can be found on the website http://R2D2.TWMAN.ORG (72
GB) [29]. The data was collected from Jan. 2017 to Aug 2017.
Approximately 2 million of benign and malicious Android
apps were collected for our experiments; till now, we have
uploaded data and results from Jan. 2017 to May 2017 and
continue to train and adjust our model.
B. Evaluations of different deep neural networks optimization
Based on our collected data, we evaluate the detection
accuracy and performance with different network model (e.g.
Alexnet, Googlenet, Inception-v3) and optimization. Noted
that the learning rate is fixed to be 0.01, the optimization
methods used are stochastic gradient descent (SGD), Nesterov
Accelerated Gradient (NAG), AdaDelta and AdaGrad. From
our experiment, we found that Inception-v3 (shown in Fig.
16) is almost always better than Alexnet (shown in Fig. 17)
and other models. It also verified that adopting Inception-v3
can solve the drawbacks that mentioned before in our R2-
D2 method. With such observation, we further fine-tuned and
compared Inception-v3 with AdaDelta and Inception-v3 with
AdaGrad (see Fig. 18), and found that SGD is best suitable for
our use (see Fig. 19). In particular, it resulted in the sharpest
increase in accuracy and sharpest decrease in loss. As a result,
we reach 98.4225% and 97.7081% accuracy.
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C. Validation on Real Environment
To infer the capability of the R2-D2 system in the de-
tection of unknown malware, we collected Android apps
on Google Play in June 2017. More specifically, we col-
lected Android apps in different categories (e.g., weather,
business, finance, travel, etc.) from different countries (e.g.,
the US, UK, France and Germany, etc.). In addition,
we also choose benign samples that none of VirusTotal
(https://www.virustotal.com) vendors report malicious. We
also selected malicious samples, the criteria for selecting
malicious samples is that more than 30 VirusTotal vendors
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Fig. 20. The evaluation results.
report malicious. We downloaded some malicious samples
from contagio (http://contagiominidump.blogspot.tw). In sum,
the above sources of benign/malicious samples are used for
verifying the detection capability of our R2-D2 system. The
evaluation metrics in our experiment include True Positive
(TP), False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Nega-
tive (TN), Accuracy (Acc), Precision (Prec), Recall (Detec-
tion Rate, DR), False Positive Rate (FPR) and F1-score (F-
measure). The evaluation results are shown in Fig. 20 with
rapid generation and mutation of malware; even the detection
model is trained based on our dataset with 1.5 million samples
(from January 2017 to May 2017). The precision is higher than
accuracy after the threshold 0.6. Moreover, when the threshold
is over 0.7, recall and F1-score start to drop, meaning that the
detection accuracy is not as good as before. This phenomenon
can confirm that though R2-D2 is able to reduce the human
labor and resource consumption, long-term sample collection
and model updating are still necessary.
D. Real Case study
We further compare our detection results to the results
reported by VirusTotal (Google’s malicious program detection
website) and various anti-virus software engines on VirusTotal
site. We collected 87 Minecraft apps that are verified by ESET
as malware from Google Play. These apps had been active on
Google Play since January 2017, and the number of installa-
tions have achieved more than 1 million. The most prominent
feature of these apps after installation is the extra module
for downloading, and the request for “Device Administrator
permission”, promoting deceptive advertisements. Google Play
has removed these apps. However, if they can be detected in
the first place without feature extraction, Android malware can
be mitigated.
From the results shown in Table I, we can find that
most of the above Minecraft malwares can be detected by
approximately 16% vendors (10/60) on 2017/03/24. Until
2017/03/30, approximately 32% vendors (20/60) can detect
these malwares. However, R2-D2 can detect more than 75%
of these apps. Our method can not only reduce the resources
that are consumed by traditional manual feature extraction
method or machine learning method, but also can better detect
unknown malware before other malware detection engines can.
E. Comparison with Existing Methodology
Finally, we try to compare our R2-D2 with DroidSieve [24]
in terms of sample size, DR/FPR, acc, and detection time.
From the results shown in Table II, it is found that R2-D2 is
slightly weaker than some others in DR/FPR and Acc. This is
due to that our R2-D2 is trained based on a significantly larger
dataset and is more adaptive to the real-world situation. It is
well known that different learning-based approaches would
perform differently for the difference of the characteristics
of its datasets. Others are trained with rather smaller dataset
that cannot reflect the real environment, plus they did not
provide the data source that they used. Moreover, R2-D2 has
distinguishing advantage that it has fast detection time, 0.5
TABLE I
THE EVALUATION RESULTS OF HASH.
MD5 Hash Date (with VT R2-D2
03/24 03/30 Result
00e10bedf33cfe4061e45ea632274d53 6/61 22/59 78.78%
1a72ba660d80564f30d17e3625b999d0 32/58 34/60 99.94%
ebd3bd60e5b68a52b24f72c3dbe87c0f 10/60 24/59 75.29%
12d2e22f7efdef5950fa82c5331eddde 37/60 40/60 99.99%
84573e568185e25c1916f8fc575a5222 23/59 25/59 98.96%
e9289ed4df621523372bc1f61e0e5e8c 10/61 22/59 75.27%
8b54fad9660d85442b0732e4ce5bcf8d 10/61 23/58 75.29%
1ceafdb0fc0c7ca1b30f1246e03e1730 10/60 23/59 83.74%
2b002dc734ecb7caf0c8bb459c7522d9 10/60 25/59 75.28%
59c83edf9a42b828aa318b36599e7bed 9/60 23/55 76.68%
TABLE II
THE RESULT OF COMPARING R2-D2 AND EXISTING RESEARCH.
Year Method Samples DR/FP (%) ACC (%) Second
2014 DenDroid 1247 - 94 -
2014 DroidAPIMiner 3987 99/2.2 - 15
2014 DroidMiner 2466 95.3/0.34 92 19.8
2014 Drebin 5560 94.0/1.0 - 0.75
2014 DroidSIFT 2200 98.0/5.15 93 175.8
2014 DroidLegacy 1052 93.0/3.0 98 -
2015 AppAudit 1005 99.3/0.61 - 0.6
2015 MudFlow 10552 90.1/18.7 - -
2015 Marvin 15741 98.24/0 - -
2015 RevealDroid 9054 98.2/18.7 93 95.2
2016 DroidScribe 5246 - 94 -
2016 Madam 2800 96/0.2 - -
2017 DroidSieve 16141 99.3/0 99 2.5
2017 R2-D2 829356 96/9 93 0.5
seconds for each coming sample. Besides, it does not need
to go through manual feature extraction engineering. Asides
from that, it takes only 0.4 second for R2-D2 to transform an
Android apps to color image.
F. Large Scale Ransomware Detection with Naked Eye
Based on our demonstration in OWASP AppSec USA 2017
and RuxCon 2017 [29], [30], here are some new results.
We trained a R2-D2 detection model with malware samples
(including Trojan, ransomware, etc) collected between 2017/1
and 2017/8.
• Given 20035 malicious samples (collected in Sep. 2017),
our model successfully detected 18514 samples among
20035 malicious samples, which implies 91.72% true
positive.
• Given 20313 benign samples (collected in Sep. 2017),
our model unsuccessfully detected 1799 samples among
20313 benign samples, which implies 8.85% false posi-
tive.
• Given 5852 ransomware samples (collected in Sep. 2017),
our model successfully detected 5670 samples among
20313 benign samples, which implies 96.88% true posi-
tive
Interestingly, we have found that we can determine ran-
somware family with naked eye, and the samples from the
same ransomware family share similarity in their visual pat-
tern. A fine-grained categorization still needs to rely on our
R2-D2, since there are always delicate differences among
samples that only R2-D2 can identify but human eyes cannot
differentiate. Such a similarity in visual pattern of ransomware
images helps us do a fast categorization of the ransomware,
and reduce labor cost.
Fig. 21. The screenshoot of our R2-D2 mobile version.
G. Hunting the Ethereum Smart Contract
Furthermore, the cryptocurrency is attracting more and more
attention because of the blockchain technology. Ethereum is
gaining a significant popularity in blockchain community,
mainly due to the fact that it is designed in a way that
enables developers to write smart contracts. However, the
security of smart contracts has not received the same attention,
and because of its openness, if there is a vulnerability in
the contract, anyone can immediately see it, but it cannot
be stopped immediately. The DAO vulnerabilities that worth
more than $50 million US dollars is an example 7. There are
many vulnerabilities in the Ethereum smart contract, including
"Call Stack Attack 8", "Time Dependance9" and various other
known vulnerabilities [32]. Based on this research, we also
translated the bytecode of solidity into RGB color code and
then transformed them into a fixed-sized encoded image and
fed to our CNN model for training and detecting vulnerability
of Ethereum smart contract. With our research, we have
demonstrated that the smart contract scan can achieve 0.90+
[33].
V. CONCLUSION
This research adopts deep learning to construct an end-
to-end learning-based Android malware detection method
and proposed a color-inspired convolutional neural network
7 https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical- update-re-dao-vulnerability,
2016.
8https://github.com/LeastAuthority/ethereumanalyses/blob/master/
GasEcon.md#callstack-depth-limit-errors
9http://martin.swende.se/blog/Breaking the house.html
(CNN)-based Android Malware detection system, labelled as
R2-D2. The results show that our detection system works
well in detecting known Android malware and even unknown
Android malware. Also, we have integrated the methodology
with the back-end of our core product to provide convenient
usage scenarios for end users or enterprises. Meanwhile,
we have integrated with tensorflow-lite directly into mobile
devices (shown in Fig. 21). It has made our experimental
results proved the effectiveness of our proposed system. The
future work is to reduce the complex task and train for higher
performance in confronting the Android malware, in order to
avoid computation burden.
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